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Info: This feature requires Assets Server 6.123 or higher.
C2PA is an open standard for content provenance, published by the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity and standardized as ISO/IEC 22144. It is also known as Content Credentials.
This article explains how C2PA is supported in Assets Server.
How C2PA works
A file with Content Credentials carries a data block — the manifest — embedded inside the file itself. The manifest contains the tool that produced it, the organization that signed it, the time of signing, and whether generative AI was used. The manifest is cryptographically signed, so a viewer can verify that this information is genuine and that the file has not been altered since it was signed.
The goal of C2PA is verifiable trust: instead of relying on a caption or a filename, anyone can check a file's origin with a verification tool.
It works as follows:
- When a device or application produces or edits a file, it writes a manifest describing itself and the actions performed, and signs it with an X.509 certificate.
- The signature covers the whole file's content. This is called hard binding: changing a single byte of the file invalidates the signature.
- When a C2PA-aware application edits a signed file, it does not modify the existing content credentials. Instead, it appends a new manifest and keeps the previous one inside as an ingredient, building a verifiable chain.
- A verification tool checks that the signature still matches the file content and who the signer is, by checking the signing certificate against the C2PA trust list.
A file whose signature no longer matches is reported as tampered; the standard deliberately makes any unaccounted-for modification visible.
Why this conflicts with metadata embedding
Assets Server writes metadata into the original files: on import and again when metadata changes, Assets Server embeds its fields configured for embedding directly into the file.
For an unsigned file this is harmless. For a file with Content Credentials it is destructive: embedding rewrites the file's content, which breaks the signature. From that moment, verification tools report the file as tampered.
Content Credentials in Assets Server
Assets Server provides several ways to handle a C2PA signature.
It is configured by a cluster property named c2paMode on the Cluster properties page in the Management Console.
It accepts three values:
- off (default value)
- strip
- preserve
In every mode except off, Assets Server checks files for Content Credentials whenever it extracts metadata and validates the signature of the credentials it finds. The mode then decides what happens whenever Assets Server is about to rewrite an original to embed metadata:
| Mode | File without credentials | Valid credentials | Broken credentials |
|---|---|---|---|
| off | Metadata is embedded | Embedded. The signature breaks, broken credentials stay in the file. | Embedded. |
| strip | Metadata is embedded | Embedded, credentials are removed. | Embedded, credentials are removed. |
| preserve | Metadata is embedded | The file is never rewritten. | Embedded, credentials are removed. |
- off. Default value. No provenance information is recorded, and files with credentials are rewritten like any other file, silently breaking their signatures. Choose it when Content Credentials play no role in your workflows.
- strip. Metadata embedding keeps working for every file, and Content Credentials are removed in the same rewrite. Verification tools then report 'no Content Credentials' instead of 'tampered'.
- preserve. Files with a valid signature are never rewritten, and later metadata edits are stored only in the index, not in the file. Choose it when Content Credentials signatures must be preserved.
|
Note: An additional value named sign is planned for a future release. For Content Credentials signed by Assets Server need to be recognized as trusted by verification tools, WoodWing needs a signing certificate issued by a C2PA-approved certificate provider, and Assets Server needs to be registered on the C2PA Conforming Products List. WoodWing is currently working on an agreement with a certificate provider. This process takes time, and the remaining implementation of the sign option can only be completed once the agreement is in place. The sign option will therefore be introduced in a future release. |
Rules that apply in every active mode:
- A signature that is cryptographically intact counts as valid even if the signer is not on the public trust list. A private or in-house certificate is respected. Credentials that are already broken are treated as if the file were unsigned: embedding keeps working.
- When in doubt, Assets Server does not modify the file. If the signature could not be validated, for example because the verification tool failed, the file is treated as protected in every active mode. A valid signature is never traded away on uncertain information.
- The PDF format is a special case: Content Credentials in PDF files are detected and validated. They cannot, however, be removed due to the current tooling limitations.
What Assets Server includes on write
In every active mode, Assets Server records 6 read-only metadata fields from the C2PA group:
Note: None of these fields is written to (embedded in) the file. These are stored in the index.
| # | Display name | Field name | Value | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Credentials present | c2paManifest |
true false |
Whether the stored original currently carries Content Credentials. |
| 2 | Signature state | c2paValidationState |
valid invalid |
The field value is empty when the validation fails (see rule 2 described above: 'When in doubt, Assets Server does not modify the file'). |
| 3 | Signing organization | c2paSigner |
Who signed the file. Example: 'Reuters' or 'Adobe Inc.'. |
|
| 4 | Producing tool | c2paClaimGenerator |
The tool that produced the credentials. Example: 'Adobe Photoshop' or 'Leica M11-P'. |
|
| 5 | AI-generated marker | c2paAiGenerated |
true false |
true when the credentials mark the content as AI-generated. The whole credential chain is considered, including ingredients. |
| 6 | Signing date | c2paSignDate |
When the credentials were signed. |
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Notes:
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